I. Rule 10B-5 by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 4 Article 7
Fall 9-1-1976
I. Rule 10B-5
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
I. Rule 10B-5, 33 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937 (1976), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol33/iss4/7
1975-1976 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
I. RULE 10b-5
A. Scienter
In recent years, confusion has arisen regarding the proper stan-
dard of culpability-scienterl-to be applied in actions under Rule
10b-5.1 The courts have differed primarily on the issue of the ade-
I Scienter refers to the degree of culpability necessary for liability under the fed-
eral securities laws. In the securities fraud context, scienter can refer to a number of
degrees of culpability. The least degree of fault is negligence, generally termed a lack
of due diligence or unreasonable conduct. Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 545, 549
(D. Md. 1971). The next higher degree is recklessness, defined as a failure or refusal
to ascertain material facts when readily available. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d
115, 123-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). The two highest degrees of
culpability are knowledge and intent to defraud. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrmEs LAW:
FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5, § 8.4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]. The term does
not refer to the common law meaning of conscious intent to defraud. See, e.g., Globus
v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970). For an historical discussion of the scienter requirement in the context of Rule
10b-5, see Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 598-600 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Bucklo]. See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255, 312-16 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
2 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits have allowed recovery under Rule 10b-5 upon
proof of negligence. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.
1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). The Ninth Circuit opted for a flexible duty
standard, under which negligence would sometimes constitute the appropriate scienter
standard. See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974), noted in 32 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 99 (1975). The Second and Fifth Circuits have required proof of at least
recklessness. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC
v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970). The Third and Fourth
Circuits, although declining to determine a minimum standard, have indicated that
actual knowledge would constitute sufficient scienter. See Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d
251 (4th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1974). The
Tenth Circuit has stated that it would require more than mere negligence to meet its
scienter standard. See Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1007 (1975). Yet the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst, infra note 4, noted that
few cases holding negligence sufficient involved only negligent conduct. 96 S. Ct. at
1381 n.12. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286
(3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, supra note 1, at 568-70 (1972).
Many commentators have stated that negligence should not constitute a sufficient
culpability standard. See 3 L. Loss, SEcURTIEs REGULATION 1766 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id.,
at 3883-90 (Supp. 1969); Bucklo, supra note 1, at 596-97; Ruder, Civil Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 678 (1963); Note, Civil Liability Under Section lOB
and Rule IOB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing The Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658,
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quacy of negligence as a culpability standard .3 The United States
Supreme Court virtually resolved this issue in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder' by holding that a private cause of action for damages
would not lie under Rule 10b-5 absent allegations of intent to deceive,
manipulate or defraud.5 In determining that negligence is not a suffi-
cient standard of culpability, the Court added another substantial
barrier to the plaintiff's right of action under the Rule.' Together with
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,7 Ernst & Ernst indicates
an effort by the Supreme Court to restrict the growth of Rule 10b-5
liability in recent years.
Ernst & Ernst involved a suit against an independent auditing
firm for aiding and abetting securities fraud through inaction. The
defendant, Ernst & Ernst, had failed to investigate the primary
wrongdoer's office rule forbidding the opening of his mail. The stock-
holder plaintiff maintained that this "mail rule" was a material inad-
equacy in internal accounting controls which the defendant had a
duty to investigate. 8 Ernst & Ernst's failure to investigate and report
the "mail rule" allegedly aided and abetted a Rule 10b-5 violation.
The district court's summary judgment in favor of Ernst & Ernst was
reversed by the Seventh Circuit.9 The circuit court reasoned that if
the defendant breached a duty of inquiry and disclosure owed to the
plaintiff, the latter could recover by demonstrating a causal connec-
tion between the breach and the underlying fraud."0
682-89 (1965); Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1080-81 (1969);
82 HARv. L. REV. 938, 947 (1969). But see Note, Negligent Misrepresentations Under
Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CH. L. REV. 824, 839-44 (1965).
See note 2 supra.
4 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
Id. at 1381.
The Supreme Court also sharply limited the scope of Rule 10b-5 in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), upholding the Rule's purchaser-
seller requirement. See Survey of 1974 Securities Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 719, 742-50 (1975).
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1109 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S.
Ct. 1375 (1976).
9 In an unreported opinion, the district court rejected Ernst & Ernst's contention
that a cause of action for aiding-abetting a securities fraud could not be maintained
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It concluded, how-
ever, that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Ernst &
Ernst had conducted its audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards. Civ. No. 71 C 454 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1973).
10 503 F.2d at 1104. In support of this holding, the Seventh Circuit cited its deci-
sion in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 875 (1974), where it detailed the elements necessary to establish a claim under
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In overturning the Seventh Circuit decision, the Supreme Court
first addressed an argument concerning the language of § 10(b) of the
1934 Act," upon which Rule 10b-512 is based. The Securities Ex-
change Commission in its amicus curiae brief maintained that the
words "manipulative or deceptive" in conjunction with the "device
or contrivance" language were not particularly enlightening in deter-
mining the scienter standard intended by Congress. To support this
contention, the SEC cited the overall congressional purpose in the
1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors from false and deceptive
practices that might injure them. 3 In view of this purpose and be-
cause the effect upon investors would be the same regardless of
whether the fraudulent conduct is negligent or intentional, the SEC
concluded that Congress must have meant to bar all such conduct.
Rule 10b-5 based on a defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by
inaction. In such a case, the plaintiff must show "that the party charged with aiding
and abetting had knowledge of or, but for the breach of a duty of inquiry, should have
had knowledge of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party failed to
act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclosure." Id. at 374. In Ernst
& Ernst, the court explained that these elements constituted a flexible standard of
liability which should be amplified according to the peculiarities of each case. 503 F.2d
at 1104.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). Section 10 makes it:
unlawful for any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
2 SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975), provides:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
I 96 S. Ct. at 1383. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11-12 (1971);
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964). See also SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
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The Court was not persuaded by this effect-oriented approach, how-
ever, finding that the statutory language clearly reflected congres-
sional intent to proscribe only knowing, intentional misconduct de-
signed to deceive investors." Moreover, the -Court noted that this
approach, applied to its fullest extent, would impose liability for
wholly faultless conduct.
The SEC also argued that because § 10(b) is not by its terms
explicitly restricted to willful, knowing or purposeful conduct, it
should not be construed in all cases to require more than negligence
as a precondition for civil liability. 5 The Court refuted this argument,
recognizing that in each instance where Congress created express civil
liability in the securities laws, it clearly specified whether recovery
was premised upon knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or
mere mistake." Additionally, each of the express civil remedies in the
1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct 7 is subject to impor-
tant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b).18 The Court
determined that permitting a negligence standard for § 10(b) actions
would nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural re-
strictions on the express actions granted elsewhere in the securities
laws. In the Court's opinion, to allow such circumvention would be
contrary to congressional intent. 9
The majority likewise rejected a flexible construction of § 10(b)
" 96 S. Ct. at 1383-84. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d
Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Loss, Summary
Remarks, 30 Bus. LAw. 163, 165 (1975). See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,
458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., concurring).
"1 The SEC contrasted § 10(b) with § 9 of the1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970),
which explicitly requires intentional conduct, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970).
11 96 S. Ct. at 1384. See §§ 11, 12 and 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, o
(1970), and §§ 9, 18 and 20 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, r, t (1970). Section 11,
for example, expressly recognizes a cause of action premised on negligent behavior by
an expert in preparing registration statements.
11 Sections 11, 12(2) and 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1, o (1970). Each of the provisions
of the 1934 Act that expressly creates civil liability, see note 21 infra, requires a higher
degree of culpability than negligence.
"1 For example, § 11(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970), authorizes the
court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under §§ 11, 12(2) or 15 thereof to post a
bond for costs. Id. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), imposes a one-year statute of
limitations from the time the violation was or should have been discovered. Id.
1 96 S. Ct. at 1384. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867-68 (2d
Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1948); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1070-74 (3d ed. 1972); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 1787-88 (2d ed.
1961).
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under the pretext of effectuating the securities laws' remedial pur-
poses. 0 The Court recognized that Congress, in seeking to accomplish
broad remedial goals, did not uniformly adopt a negligence standard
even as to express civil remedies." Instead, it fashioned standards of
culpability on a section-by-section basis. Since the Court had already
determined that the language of § 10(b) did not contemplate a negli-
gence standard, the "remedial purpose" argument could not stand.
The Court also scrutinized the legislative history of the 1934 Act
to ascertain congressional intent on the negligence issue. Although
the history contained no explicit discussion of the intended scope
of § 10(b), one statement made by a spokesman for the drafters of
§ 10(b) evinced that the section was to enable the SEC "to deal with
new manipulative devices." 2 The Court expressed doubt "that any
lawyer, legislative draftsman or legislator would use these words if the
intent was to create liability for merely negligent acts or omissions."
The majority found further support for its conclusion in the legis-
lative reports. Although the reports did not directly address the scope
or function of § 10(b), they did indicate that liability would not result
from specific manipulative practices which did not involve intent to
defraud.uA The Court interpreted this as indicating congressional re-
luctance to impose a lesser standard under § 10(b).2
20 96 S. Ct. at 1384. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 375 U.S. 180, 186
(1963).
21 96 S. Ct. at 1384. In some circumstances, Congress did create express liability
predicated upon a failure to exercise reasonable care. See, e.g., § 11(b)(3)(B) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1970) (liability of experts for misleading state-
ments in portions of registration statements for which they are responsible). Elsewhere,
however, good faith is an absolute defense. See, e.g., § 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r (1970) (misleading statements in any document filed pursuant to 1934 Act). In
a third set of circumstances, Congress created strict liability. See, e.g., § 11(a) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970).
22 This description was made by Thomas G. Corcoran in the Hearings on H.R.
7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
96 S. Ct. at 1385.
21 See S. Rap. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). The Report addressed certain
practices which required express prohibition, such as "wash sales," and "matched
orders," 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(1) (1970), and other practices like option grants and secu-
rity price stabilization, which were left to regulation by the SEC. Even in the discus-
sion of the latter type of practice, no indication could be found that liability was to
attach without intent to defraud. Moreover, with respect to the specified practices, the
Report indicated that private actions for damages would exist only when the defendant
did not act in good faith. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1934). See H.
REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 10-11, 20-21 (1934).
96 S. Ct. at 1386.
1976]
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The final argument posed by the SEC was that subsections (2)
and (3) of Rule 10b-516 could be read as proscribing any type of mate-
rial misstatement or omission and any course of conduct which would
defraud investors. The Court responded by holding that the scope of
the Rule could not exceed the power granted the SEC by Congress
under § 10(b). Since § 10(b) speaks specifically in terms of manipula-
tion and deception and of implementing devices and contrivances-
commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoings-and
since its history reflects no more expansive intent, the Court was
unwilling to extend the scope of the Rule to include negligent
conduct.
2
Despite an extensive examination of statutory language and his-
tory, Ernst & Ernst does not completely resolve the issue of scienter
in Rule 10b-5 litigation. First, the Court specifically refused to ad-
dress the issue of whether reckless behavior is sufficient for civil lia-
bility under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.2 This may be significant, be-
cause in some cases the difference between standards of negligence
and recklessness is slight.2 Indeed, the failure of the accountant in
Ernst & Ernst to discover the "mail rule" may constitute a reckless
violation as well as a negligent one. In light of the Court's recent
reluctance to broaden the class of plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 litigation,"
25 See note 12 supra.
96 S. Ct. at 1391. The Court was also unwilling to extend the class of potential
plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 litigation, an inevitable result under a holding approving a
negligence standard. Such a holding would extend the hazards of rendering expert
advice under the securities laws to new frontiers and raise serious policy questions not
yet addressed by Congress. 96 S. Ct. at 1391 n.33.
21 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12. See note 1 supra.
29 The reckless disregard standard was recently applied by a district court in the
Second Circuit in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp.
112 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Herzfeld involved a qualified auditor's report of a corporation
that was misleading to investors. Id. at 125. In creating a test for liability, the court
stated that the culpability standard for failure to discover omissions or misrepresen-
tations was willful, deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. This standard in-
cludes failure or refusal to discover and report material facts when readily available
and when there is reason to believe they exist. See Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d
115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). While the Herzfeld court's know-
ledge standard included liability for a reckless failure to discover fraudulent conduct,
and is thus distinguishable from negligence, the application of such a standard to
circumstances involving independent auditors may reach negligence. This reckless-
ness, or inquiry-notice, standard is important for an accountant who will be aware of
many material facts. If he should ignore even one of them, such as the "mail rule" in
Ernst & Ernst, then arguably there is a reckless violation. Under such circumstances,
the distinction between recklessness and negligence virtually disappears.
1 96 S. Ct. at 1391 n.33; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
747-48 (1975).
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however, the future vitality of the recklessness standard is question-
able. To be successful, a plaintiff suing under a recklessness theory31
would have to convince the court that recklessness more closely re-
sembles knowing, intentional conduct than negligence.2
Moreover, the Court discussed neither the propriety of civil liabil-
ity for aiding-abetting under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,3 nor the distinc-
tion between active and passive aiding-abetting. Yet in view of the
holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud is required
for civil liability under the section and the rule," the Court likely
intended all such violations, primary and secondary, active and pas-
sive, to be within the scope of the decision. Thus, no matter what type
of violation is involved, liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will
not be imposed without a showing of more than negligent conduct.36
Finally, the Court did not consider whether knowing, intentional
conduct is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11 Since most private parties seek monetary
damages rather than injunctive relief in federal antifraud litigation,
the policy underlying Ernst & Ernst which limits the class of Rule
10b-5 plaintiffs' seems inapplicable. Therefore, the validity of neg-
ligence allegations in suits for injunctive relief remains an open ques-
tion. 9
Although the Court left certain questions unanswered by its deci-
sion in Ernst & Ernst, it nonetheless imposed a significant obstacle
11 See notes 1 & 29 supra.
32 See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,
126 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3 96 S. Ct. at 1380 n.7. See generally, Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification
and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 620-45 (1972). The Court also refused to
discuss the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for aiding-abetting. Id.
3' See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA.
L. REv. 597, 641-46 (1972).
3 96 S. Ct. at 1381.
31 By its choice of Ernst & Ernst as the factual vehicle for its anti-negligence
holding, the Court indicated that liability for passive aiding-abetting would require
more than negligence.
31 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963).
-u See note 30 supra.
31 The Supreme Court also ignored the injunctive relief exception to Rule 10b-5's
purchaser-seller requirement in its recent decision upholding that requirement. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453,465-68 (1969); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 193 (1963); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
But cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
1976]
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before securities fraud claimants. This limitation seems justified in
light of the policy of investor protection behind federal securities law.
If other elements of proof, such as privity and reliance, were elimi-
nated or relaxed, investors injured through negligent misconduct
would have less difficulty in recovering damages. However, elimi-
nation of the intentional conduct requirement and substitution of a
negligence test in private actions might well cause unwarranted in-
jury to innocent shareholders, who must ultimately pay for corporate
mistakes. 0
B. Aiding-Abetting
Secondary liability, imposed upon those who aid and abet pri-
mary securities law violators, is another aspect of Rule 10b-5 that has
received recent judicial attention.4 Aiding-abetting normally re-
quires intent to further a scheme to defraud, or knowledge of such a
scheme-scienter,2 combined with substantial assistance 43 to the pri-
1O See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Friendly, J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Bucklo, supra note 1, at
596-97 (1972).
1 See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aid-
ing and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder]; see also Lowenfels, Expanding
Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of
Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 412 (1974).
11 Scienter refers to the degree of culpability necessary for liability under the
securities laws. In the securities fraud context, scienter has referred to a number of
degrees of culpability. The least degree of fault has been negligence, generally termed
a lack of due diligence or unreasonable conduct. Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D.
545, 549 (D. Md. 1971). In light of the Supreme Court ruling in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, supra note 4, negligence no longer suffices to constitute scienter. The next
higher degree is recklessness, defined as a failure or refusal to ascertain material facts
when readily available. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). The validity of this culpability standard is unclear after
Ernst & Ernst. See 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12. The two highest degrees of culpability are
knowledge and intent to defraud. See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECTmEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC
RULE 10b-5 § 8.4 (1973). The term does not refer to the common law meaning of
conscious intent to defraud. See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d
1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). For a good historical discussion
of the scienter requirement in the 10b-5 context, see Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5,
67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 598 (1972).
11 Substantial assistance may be given by active participation in the scheme. See,
e.g., Rosen v. Dick, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,786
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp.
702, 728 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 989 (1970). It may also include mere inaction if the secondary defendant is one
upon whom the securities laws impose special duties. See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
mary wrongdoer." In private actions, courts have generally imposed
secondary liability upon proof of actual knowledge of the fraudulent
scheme." Not until recently, however, have courts distinguished be-
tween active and passive assistance in establishing standards of culp-
ability in private actions. 6 In Woodward v. Metro Bank,47 the Fifth
Circuit examined this distinction as it relates to the scienter require-
ment.
The plaintiff cosigned a 90-day note, secured in part by the pledge
of her stock. The defendant bank gave this stock to a corporation
under the control of the primary wrongdoer, Starnes. Through misre-
presentations and failure to disclose material information about the
poor financial condition of the corporation he controlled, Starnes had
induced the plaintiff to cosign the note and pledge a certificate of
deposit against the debt owed defendant bank by the corporation. In
her Rule 10b-5 action, the plaintiff alleged that the bank had aided
and abetted the primary violator by failing to disclose the material
facts regarding the corporation's financial status and thereby fur-
thered the scheme to defraud. The court refused to hold the bank
secondarily liable, noting that "Rule 10b-5 was not designed to be the
ethical Ten Commandments for all securities transactions."4 9 It rea-
soned that although investor protection is of major importance under
the Rule, expanding 10b-5 liability to cover all loan accommodation
arrangements would impair the maintenance of a vigorous business
community.
Upon examining prior aiding-abetting cases, the court considered
F.2d 1277, 1302-03 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
" See Rosen v. Dick, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,786
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp.
673, 681-82 (N.D. Ind. 1966), 286 F. Supp. 702, 728 (N.D. Ind. 1968), af'd, 417 F.2d
147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Ruder, supra note 41, at
620.
Aiding-abetting differs from primary liability because it involves a lesser degree
of participation or importance of the acts performed. See 2 BROMBERG, supra note 1,
§ 8.5 (515) (1973). See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1097
(2d Cir. 1972).
41 See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1302-03 (2d Cir. 1973).
4' See Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 375 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (negligence standard for active aiding-abetting); Hoch-
felder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1114 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976)
(negligence standard for inactive aiding-abetting).
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the holding in SEC v. Coffey,5" in reaching a solution most applicable
to the facts before it. In Coffey, the Sixth Circuit required that the
aider-abettor first be aware that his conduct was part of an overall
improper activity, and second, that the aider-abettor have knowingly
and substantially assisted the violation."'
The Woodward court found the first element of Coffey dependent
upon the business expectations of the parties. If the alleged aider-
abettor conducts what appears to be an ordinary business transac-
tion, Woodward would require more evidence of his complicity. For
example, if securities fraud were perpetrated in the sale of shares of
common stock, it would be difficult for an aider-abettor of that fraud
to claim innocence once it was shown that he knew of the general
sales activity. However, where a commercial transaction appears or-
dinary on its face, the alleged aider-abettor may be unaware of any
improper activity.2 In such a case, liability would likely be imposed
0 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). See Survey of
1974 Securities Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 719, 754-64 (1975). In
Coffey, the Sixth Circuit found that a person may be held liable as an aider-abettor
only if some other party has committed a securities law violation; if the accused party
has general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper;
and if the alleged aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the violation. 493
F.2d at 1316. See 2 BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 8.5 (582) (1971).
The test in Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974), is similar, but there the court refers to "an independent wrong" rather than a
securities law violation, and knowledge of the wrong's existence rather than awareness
of a role in improper activity. See Ruder, supra note 41, at 630. Landy also lacks the
"knowing" requirement for the substantial assistance element. The first two require-
ments of Landy appear to be over-inclusive and seem to lose sight of the necessary
connection to the securities laws. The existence of a "wrong" could be known without
an awareness of one's role in the scheme. The Woodward court noted this and recog-
nized that it is the knowledge of participation in the fraud that is the issue. 522 F.2d
at 95.
11 493 F.2d at 1316. The Woodward court held that the scienter requirement scales
upward as the activity is more remote and thus found the knowing and substantial
assistance to be properly required. 522 F.2d at 95.
Professor Ruder has suggested that the secondary defendant must know of the
illegal act and render positive assistance to the primary wrongdoers. Ruder, supra note
41, at 600. Professor Bromberg states that the law still lacks a meaningful definition
of aiding-abetting, but he also notes that one fairly common and important thread in
the judicial verbalizations, which is taken from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, is that the
aider-abettor's conduct must be "substantial." BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 8.5 (530)
(1974). The RESTATEMENT provision Bromberg refers to requires knowledge of another's
breach of duty and substantial assistance or encouragement. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 877 (1939).
52 522 F.2d at 95. Such lack of awareness may be the result of independent com-
mercial assumptions. For example, if the document were questionably like a loan, the
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only if a court found a special duty of inquiry and public disclosure
upon the particular type of party, such as an insider,5 3 controlling
person, 4 accountant5 or broker. Absent such a duty, the Woodward
holding requires some knowledge of impropriety before imposing sec-
ondary liability under Rule 10b-5.57
The Fifth Circuit also stated that the extent to which mere silence
or inaction by the defendant could fulfill the requirement of "know-
ing, substantial assistance"-the second element of the Coffey
test5 5-depended upon the nature of the duty owed by the alleged
aider-abettor to the other parties to the transaction. The Sixth Cir-
cuit in Coffey suggested that courts impose liability only where the
silence of the alleged aider-abettor was consciously intended to aid
the securities law violation.5
court indicated reluctance to impose upon the bank a duty to investigate and to
disclose any impropriety to the plaintiff cosigner. Id. The bank in effect is entitled to
assume that the transaction is free of fraud. Thus, the Fifth Circuit expressed its
unwillingness to make the bank an insurer of every loan transaction it handled. Cf.
Grimes, Hooper & Messer, Inc. v. Pierce, 519 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975) (bank not liable
under Rule 10b-5 for supplying credit reference which did not indicate defendant's poor
financial condition).
0 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
11 See § 20 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970).
5 See § 18 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). But cf. Gold v. DCL Inc., [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. S.c. L. REP. 94,036 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1973) (account-
ing firm that neither rendered any certification nor invited public to rely on its finan-
cial judgment was under no duty to disclose publicly that issuer's earnings statement
was misleading or incomplete).
51 See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
11 Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); BROMBEaG,
supra note 1, § 8.5 (582) (1974); Ruder, supra note 41, at 630-31. Indeed, the court
held that even remote parties must not only be aware of their roles, but should also
know when and to what degree they are furthering the fraud. 522 F.2d at 95.
"' The standards courts have used for measuring culpability by silence have var-
ied. Some declare without qualification that silence and inaction alone can create
liability for aiding-abetting. See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740
(10th Cir. 1974); Fischer v. New York Stock Exch., CCH FED. S-c. L. REP. 95,416
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1976); Green v. Jonhop, 358 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ore. 1973);
Anderson v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Minn. 1968). See also
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
Other courts have flatly rejected the notion that inaction alone is sufficient. See
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971); Ruder, supra note 41, at 642-44.
11 493 F.2d at 1317. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, CCH FED. SEc. L. RaEP. 95,313
(3d Cir. Sept. 29, 1975).
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In devising its culpability standard, the Woodward court com-
bined this language with that in Strong v. France," which held that
liability for silence or inaction arises only if a duty to disclose exists."
Consequently, Woodward held that absent a duty of disclosure, an
alleged aider-abettor should be held liable only if scienter of the high
"conscious intent" variety can be proved. If some special duty of
disclosure exists,12 however, then liability is possible with a lesser
degree of scienter.'3 In a case involving both silence/inaction and
affirmative assistance, the degree of knowledge required was held to
depend upon the ordinariness of the assisting activity in the alleged
fraudulent transaction;" the court would infer the knowledge needed
for aiding-abetting liability only if the pertinent transaction was
atypical or lacked business justification. 5
Thus, the Fifth Circuit in Woodward adopted with slight modifi-
cation the culpability standard implied by the Sixth Circuit in
Coffey. Significantly, Woodward applied this standard to a private
action, whereas the Coffey court considered it only in terms of an
enforcement suit for injunctive relief. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit
was not willing to follow the decision in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock
Exchange" holding active aider-abettors liable under a negligence
standard. 7 Without specifically considering the issue of purely active
aiding-abetting, the Woodward court indicated that some special
duty of inquiry or disclosure would be required before it adopted a
standard lower than knowing, intentional conduct. As to inactive
aiding-abetting, however, the Fifth Circuit is in agreement with
474 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 752.
62 See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
11 522 F.2d at 97. However, Ernst & Ernst has indicated that the degree of scienter
may not go below a standard of recklessness. 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n.12. Cf. City Nat'l Bank
v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); accord, Vohs
v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1974); Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971).
11 522 F.2d at 97. See H. L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,380 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1975). Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972) (no special duty for ordinary function of transfer agent).
11 In addition, substantiality of the assistance was found to be a prerequisite to
liability in every instance. 522 F.2d at 97. See Landy, supra note 50, at 163; BROMBERG,
supra note 1, § 8.5 (530) (1974).
s 583 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974). Midwest Stock
Exchange involved claims of aiding-abetting resulting from negligent supervision of a
securities broker and the subsequent failure to detect his fraudulent operations.
" The negligence standard is no longer valid in light of the recent Ernst & Ernst
decision by the Supreme Court, supra note 4.
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Midwest Stock Exchange; where inaction is involved, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant knew, or but f'or a breach of his duty
of inquiry and disclosure, would have known of the fraud."8
These holdings are consonant with the Supreme Court ruling in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder0' that negligence is not a proper standard
of culpability for aiding-abetting, whether of the active or passive
variety.70 The Fifth Circuit in Woodward was willing to lower the
scienter requirement if the law imposed a special duty upon the de-
fendant, as in Ernst & Ernst, but not below a recklessness stan-
dard-the equivalent of knowledge. 7' The standard imposed by the
Fifth Circuit also resembles the "flexible duty" standard used by the
Ninth Circuit which allows recklessness as a culpability standard
only when the securities laws impose a high standard of conduct upon
the defendant.72 The modification added by Woodward, that the de-
gree of knowledge required depends upon the conventionality of the
pertinent commercial transaction, has actually been an implied ele-
ment of other decisions.73
" Id. at 374. See Fischer v. New York Stock Exch., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,416
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1976) (scienter sufficiently pleaded if plaintiff alleged Exchange
knew or should have known lenders unaware of nondisclosed facts-duty to disclose).
e' 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976). See section on scienter supra.
" See 96 S. Ct. at 1381.
7' Since the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst did not address the validity of the
recklessness standard, id. at 1381 n.12, it is arguably still valid. This standard was
applied by a district court in the Second Circuit in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y..1974). Herzfeld involved a qualified
auditor's corporation report that was misleading to investors. Id. at 125. In creating
its test for liability-whether the report represented a fair and true financial pic-
ture-the court stated that the culpability standard for failure to discover omissions
or misrepresentations was willful, deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. This
standard includes failure or refusal to discover and convey material facts when readily
available and when there is reason to believe they exist. See Cohen v. Franchard Corp.,
478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). Thus, the difference
between a negligence and recklessness or inquiry-notice standard may often be mar-
ginal. For example, the failure of the accountant in Ernst & Ernst to discover the "mail
rule" would seem to constitute a reckless violation as well as a negligent one.
72 See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 736 (9th Cir. 1974); Note, The Development
of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 99 (1975).
11 In determining duties of inquiry and disclosure, the courts have almost certainly
considered the nature of the transaction involved. For example, in Ernst & Ernst the
Seventh Circuit imposed a negligence standard upon the defendant independent au-
diting firm because the "mail rule" was a material inadequacy and not sufficiently
conventional to escape defendant's duty of inquiry.
Another example is found in Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d 100
(5th Cir. 1970), in which the court found that a duty of inquiry upon a stock brokerage
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In Woodward, the Fifth Circuit was unwilling to extend the scope
of Rule 10b-5 liability to parties remotely involved in the actual
fraud. 4 Thus, it refused to hold aider-abettors, either active or inac-
tive, to a negligence standard of culpability. Such a determination
is consonant with the policies underlying federal securities laws of
providing investor protection without imposing crushing financial lia-
bility upon violators. 7 To impose liability upon those who merely
know of fraudulent conduct but have no separate duty to act or upon
those who assist in fraudulent conduct without knowing that the
conduct is unlawful would unfairly extend liability to many persons
whose primary businesses are unrelated to the securities markets. 6
By declaring the culpability standard to be a function of the legal
duties imposed upon the defendants and the conventionality of the
commercial transaction involved, the Fifth Circuit has placed reason-
able and effective limits upon secondary liability under Rule 10b-5.
Since imposition of a recklessness standard will normally include
those defendants who would also be held liable under the broader
negligence standard," the former standard appears better suited as
a limitation. Inflexible imposition of a negligence standard would
render the securities laws "amorphous snares for guilty and innocent
alike." 8
C. Purchaser-Seller Requirement
Courts have limited the class of plaintiffs suing under Rule
10b-579 to those alleging fraudulent activity in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.80 This purchaser-seller requirement was
first formulated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,' and is more
firm was breached by the broker's continuing to accept its customer's personal checks
after prior checks had been dishonored for insufficient funds. Normally, such an irregu-
larity required the customer's trading account to be frozen for a period of 90 days.
14 The court did note, however, that its decision was not intended to exempt all
bank-associated notes from Rule 10b-5 coverage. Under different facts, demonstrating
awareness of complicity and substantial assistance, it would hold a bank to account.
522 F.2d at 100.
71 See Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 651-52.
7' Ruder, supra note 41, at 646. See note 59 supra.
7 See note 71 supra.
522 F.2d at 97.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
1o Id. This same language appears in § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
81 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
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commonly known as the Birnbaum Rule. Courts began to erode
Birnbaum by creating exceptions to the Ruie in circumstances in-
volving forced sales resulting from short form mergers,"2 aborted pur-
chases and sales,83 de facto sales,"4 private injunctive actions,85 and
11 Forced sales involve plaintiffs who have neither bought nor sold, but who none-
theless have been granted standing under Rule 10b-5 because defendant's fraudulent
conduct will force him to sell in the future. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374
F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
"This term refers to plaintiffs who have neither bought nor sold because of
defendant's fraud. See, e.g., A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
8' This term includes those with beneficial interests in a security who are other-
wise barred from seeking Rule 10b-5 relief because they do not hold the legal title. See,
e.g., James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973).
Thomas v. Roblin Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975), was a post-Blue Chip
case involving a plaintiff who apparently sought Rule 10b-5 standing under the de facto
seller exception. Plaintiff was the trustee in bankruptcy of Erie Forge & Steel Corp.
(Erie); defendant (Roblin Indus.) was the former majority stockholder of Erie. Plaintiff
sought to recover the amount Roblin had received from the public sale of its Erie stock
after Erie had filed for bankruptcy. Roblin had allegedly sold the stock publicly when
it had inside information regarding recent financial losses. Plaintiff claimed a benefi-
cial interest in this stock because Roblin as controlling shareholder had a fiduciary
duty to the corporation not to sell for its own benefit based on confidential information
acquired through its fiduciary position. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241,
70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d
910 (1969).
The court held that the trustee lacked standing to sue under Rule 10b-5 because
neither the trustee nor the secured creditors he represented had complained of a trans-
action in which any of them was a buyer or seller of Erie's securities. 520 F.2d at 1396.
The court cited Blue Chip for its basic affirmance of the Birnbaum Rule without
discussing the de facto seller exception. Yet it seems that this exception applies.
Although the trustee did not hold the legal title to the stock, he had a beneficial
interest in retaining the assets of Erie after it had filed for bankruptcy. Arguably, Erie's
assets included the stock held by the controlling party (Roblin) in light of the fiduciary
duty set out in Diamond and Brophy, supra. Because of the fiduciary duty set forth
in these cases, Roblin could be considered a type of trustee similar to those in the other
de facto seller cases, James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973), and
Heyman v. Heyman, 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Cambridge Capital
Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 350 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1972).
The court found the Diamond and Brophy principle inapplicable because the
allegedly inside information regarding Erie's current financial status was not suffi-
ciently material. Thus, the fiduciary duty did not exist in this case, and the court did
not need to consider the present validity of the de facto seller exception. If the informa-
tion had been material, the Third Circuit would have been obligated to analyze Blue
Chip more thoroughly.
The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip, however, may have effectively ended
the vitality of the de facto seller standing. The Court stated that shareholders,
creditors and others related to an issuer who suffered loss in the value of their invest-
ment due to fraudulent corporate or insider activity would be barred by Birnbaum.
421 U.S. at 738. Moreover, the emphasis throughout Blue Chip that one must meet
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corporate antifraud derivative suits.8" The Seventh Circuit rejected
the Birnbaum Rule entirely." Recently, however, in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,8" the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
validity of a strict purchaser-seller requirement. Although the Court
indicated that nonpurchasers and nonsellers will be barred from
maintaining private damage actions under Rule 10b-5, the question
remains as to whether any of the judicially-created exceptions to the
Birnbaum Rule survived the decision." Since Blue Chip, courts have
explicitly dealt only with the derivative action"0 and private injunc-
tive relief exceptions.9 The derivative action exception is still ac-
knowledged, but decisions conflict over the validity of the private
injunctive relief exception. Other recent decisions, not specifically
addressing the established exceptions, have rigidly applied the
Birnbaum Rule in a variety of contexts to exclude claimants not
strictly purchasers or sellers of securities.1
2
Derivative Suits and Private Injunctive Relief
In Wright v. Heizer Corp.," an Illinois district court upheld the
validity of the derivative suit exception. The plaintiffs in Wright sued
derivatively on behalf of International Digisonics Corporations
(IDC), which had sold the securities in question, alleging a series of
Rule 10b-5 violations between IDC and the defendant, Heizer Corpo-
rations. Although the plaintiffs neither purchased nor sold the securi-
the statutory definitions of purchaser and seller (e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78c (13-14) (1970))
militates against further tolerance of de facto seller standing.
See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
" A derivative action involves a suit by a shareholder to enforce a cause of action
on behalf of the corporation. Courts have allowed derivative suits in the Rule 10b-5
context if the corporation on whose behalf suit was brought was a purchaser or seller
of securities. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
11 See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), noted in 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 757 (1974).
- 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See Gallagher, lOb-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands
the Judicial Oak?, 80 DicK. L. REv. 1 (1975); Survey of 1974 Securities Law
Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 742-50 (1975).
11 In reaching its decision in Blue Chip, the Supreme Court did not directly ad-
dress any of the exceptions to Birnbaum.
" See Wright v. Heizer Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,399 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3,
1975).
, See Davis v. Davis, 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976).
' But cf. Daniel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 95,453 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 1976) (entry into involuntary, noncontributory pension plan
held to constitute sale of security for Rule 10b-5 purposes).
11 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,399 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1975).
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
ties, the court held that the Birnbaum Rule, as rearticulated in Blue
Chip, did not prohibit this action,94 since maintenance of Rule 10b-5
derivative suits merely requires purchaser or seller status by the cor-
poration."
The Wright court also considered the impact of the Blue Chip
decision upon actions for injunctive relief. It noted that the Supreme
Court's limitation in Blue Chip was merely applicable to actions for
money damages. 6 Furthermore, the policy arguments in Blue Chip
supporting the Birnbaum Rule were keyed to apprehensions of
"strike" or in terrorem actions for money damages by stockholders
or offerees who neither sell nor buy due to inaccurate reports on the
future of the company involved.97 Nonetheless, the Wright court
refused to distinguish between actions at law and in equity, holding
that the Blue Chip limitations should apply to all private Rule
10b-5 actions, regardless of the type of relief requested.
Although the Wright court suggested that the private injunctive
relief exception is no longer valid, the Fifth Circuit in Davis v. Davis99
" Id. at 99,048.
" In a derivative action the corporation is universally recognized as the real party
plaintiff. See Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Shell v. Hensley, 430
F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Dolin v. Vipont Mining Co., 384 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
96 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,399 at 99,049. See 421 U.S. at 727. The court in
Wright also recognized that the purchaser-seller rule imposes no limitation on the
standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5. See 421
U.S. at 751 n.14; SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). Moreover, the Blue
Chip Court failed to discuss or disapprove of several prior cases declining to apply the
strictures of Birnbaum to private Rule 10b-5 actions requesting solely equitable relief.
See Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434-35 (10th Cir. 1973); Kahan v. Rosenstiel,
424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967). However, it should be noted that
although the SEC need not be a purchaser or seller to seek injunctive relief, it must
show fraud in connection with a purchase or sale to obtain an injunction under Rule
10b-5.
" CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,399 at 99,049-50.
" Id. at 99,050. The court quoted with approval the language of the Supreme
Court in Blue Chip holding that shareholders and others related to an issuer who suffer
loss in the value of their investment due to fraudulent activity in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities will be denied standing under Rule 10b-5. 421 U.S. at
737, 738.
22 526 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1976). Another post-Blue Chip case supporting the
continued validity of the injunctive relief exception was Harriman v. E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,386 (D. Del. Dec. 23, 1975). The plaintiffs
in Harriman were shareholders of duPont who brought a derivative action challenging
the corporation's merger with an investment company under Rule 10b-5. Because the
court found that duPont was a purchaser and seller of securities, the plaintiffs had no
problem in satisfying the Birnbaum Rule in their derivative suit. The court considered
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disagreed. There, the plaintiffs alleged a scheme which involved de-
fendants' refusal to honor certain contracts to purchase plaintiff's
shares at the contract price and their denial of all financial resources
in order to force the plaintiff to sell the shares to defendants at a
grossly inadequate price. The court avoided discussion of the forced-
seller exception to Birnbaum, which would clearly include the plain-
tiff, and instead recognized the plaintiff as a seller by virtue of his
contracts to sell stock.""0
The Fifth Circuit also considered significant the difference be-
tween plaintiff's suit for injunctive relief and suits for monetary relief.
It concluded that a strict purchaser-seller requirement is not as criti-
cal in suits for injunctive relief as it is when damages are sought.,0 '
Although this conclusion is only dictum in Davis because plaintiff
was a seller by definition, the Fifth Circuit indicated that had plain-
tiff not been u statutory seller, he still could have pressed his claim
for injunctive relief.
The United States Supreme Court has taken various positions on
the viability of the private injunctive relief exception after Blue Chip.
in dictum, however, the necessity of the Birnbaum Rule in an injunctive Rule 10b-5
context, since the Supreme Court in Blue Chip did not address Birnbaum's
applicability to suits seeking injunctive relief. It concluded that prior cases dispensing
with Birnbaum and requiring only a causal nexus between the alleged violation and
the pleader's injuries were still good law after Blue Chip. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
II 95,386 at 98,939. See Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950 (1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1969); Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 1967).
'" A contract to buy or sell securities is expressly defined by § 3(a) of the 1934
Act as a purchase or sale of securities for the purpose of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(2)
(1970). The Supreme Court in Blue Chip explicitly recognized that if one is granted
purchaser or seller status by some definitional provision of the 1934 Act, he shall not
be denied standing to bring a Rule 10b-5 action. 421 U.S. at 750.
The Fifth Circuit also dealt with the definition of a sale to determine Rule 10b-5
standing in Spector v. LQ Motor Inns, Inc., 517 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 786 (1976). The plaintiff received stock which had been registered in his wife's
name in connection with a divorce property settlement. Plaintiff sold this stock back
to the issuer upon assurances that the stock would not be offered to the public. Shortly
thereafter, the issuer fraudulently transferred the stock to the newly-formed defendant
corporation whose stock was sold publicly. The court had no trouble in labelling the
plaintiff's contract of sale with the issuer as a "sale" transaction within the meaning
of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1970).
"01 A number of pre-Blue Chip decisions have suggested that a plaintiff's claim for
injunctive relief is not necessarily controlled by his purchaser-seller status. See Sargent
v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792
(5th Cir. 1970); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967);
O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964); Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213,
227 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Arguments supporting its continued validity include the Court's
holding in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.102 that the purchaser-
seller rule imposed no bar to SEC standing to bring actions for injunc-
tive relief under Rule 10b-5.'0 3 The Supreme Court also noted in SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,'" that it is not necessary in
suits for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the ele-
ments-such as intent to injure and actual injury-required in a suit
for monetary damages."5 Taken together, these considerations sug-
gest that the Birnbaum Rule should likewise impose no standing
limitations in actions for private injunctive relief.
Conversely, the Supreme Court recently held in Rondeau v. Mosi-
nee Paper Corp. " that private injunctive relief under § 13 of the 1934
Act'01 required a showing of irreparable harm. Also, the possibility of
adverse injunctive relief may be more of a threat to businesses than
potential monetary liability, and therefore, wield more force in settle-
ment negotiations.08 Thus, the policy considerations against vexa-
tious litigation cited in Blue Chip may similarly apply in private
actions requesting injunctive relief.' 5 Nor would exclusion of nonpur-
393 U.S. 453 (1969).
' Id. at 465-68.
,04 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
' Id. at 193. This statement was used by the Second Circuit to support the
private injunctive relief exception in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540 (2d Cir. 1967).
422 U.S. 49 (1975).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
' See Gallagher, 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps: How Stands the Judicial Oak?,
80 DICK. L. REv. 1, 40 (1975).
"I Id. The Fifth Circuit recently was asked to address the Birnbaum Rule as it
applied to those who seek only declaratory relief in a Rule 10b-5 context. In Lutgert v.
Vanderbilt Bank, 508 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1975), the court rejected plaintiff's attempt
to attach significance to the fact that he was requesting declaratory relief rather than
monetary damages. The court recognized in Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), that some courts had relaxed the
Birnbaum requirement for actions seeking injunctive relief. Id. at 589 n.8. See Kahan
v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); General
Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546 (2d Cir. 1967); Ruckle
v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). But see Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524
F.2d 577, 590 (3d Cir. 1975) (no relaxation of Birnbaum Rule where securities law
violations completed by time of suit requesting only declaratory relief). The court
stated that the rationale behind the leniency afforded injunctive relief suits was to
prevent deception which if carried to its fruition, would provide plaintiff standing to
sue for damages. The reasoning for granting standing to nonpurchasers and nonsellers
seeking only declaratory relief would be essentially the same as that for injunctive
relief. Consequently, the same considerations regarding the post-Blue Chip validity of
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chasers and nonsellers from injunctive relief under Rule 10b-5 neces-
sarily leave these parties remediless in light of protection afforded by
state securities laws." ' Consequently, rejection of this exception
would be more consistent with the holding of Blue Chip. Because of
the countervailing considerations, however, another Supreme Court
decision may be required to resolve this issue conclusively.
Aborted Purchaser/Seller"'
The aborted seller exception has also been considered in the Blue
Chip aftermath. In Thompson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.,"' an Oklahoma district court granted summary judg-
ment against a plaintiff investor who had brought suit under
§ 10(b)"3 alleging that he was induced by misrepresentations to retain
stock that was declining in value."' The court cited with approval the
the injunctive relief exception should apply to suits for declaratory relief. See text
accompanying notes 102-110 supra and infra.
110 State courts may grant broader protection from securities fraud than is avail-
able under Rule 10b-5. Compare Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.
2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969) (corporation that neither bought nor sold has cause of
action against officers, directors for insider trading) with Haberman v. Murchison, 468
F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972) (same facts, no cause of action under Rule 10b-5).
"I The term "aborted purchaser or seller" refers to plaintiffs who because of
defendant's fraud, have neither purchased nor sold. See, e.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz
& Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
"I, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. T 95,383 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 1975).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
"I The aborted seller exception received further consideration in another pre-Blue
Chip case, Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,285
(N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975). The plaintiff was a client of defendant investment adviser,
Churchill Management. Plaintiff urged standing under the aborted seller exception,
claiming he sought to enter into a security transaction as a seller, but that the transac-
tion was aborted as a result of defendant's fraud. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that
he wished to sell all of his securities but did not do so because Churchill had repre-
sented to him that the company would take plaintiff's account as it was, and that it
was unnecessary for him to liquidate his portfolio. Id. at 98,463. The court refused to
grant standing, holding that the alleged fraud was not directly connected with the
plaintiff's inability to sell his securities. Rather, the court found that the allegedly
fraudulent activity was in connection with the mismanagement of plaintiff's account
not directly involving a purchase or sale. Because there was no fraud upon which to
base plaintiff's status as an aborted seller, the exception was found inapposite.
Another case, decided before Blue Chip, that dealt with somewhat similar allega-
tions was Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
T 94,987 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1975). Plaintiff had merely claimed that he retained stock
during the period of an alleged Rule 10b-5 violation. This was clearly insufficient under
Birnbaum and other Second Circuit cases to confer Rule 10b-5 standing. See
Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,
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language in Blue Chip which denied standing to actual shareholders
of an issuer who chose not to sell because of an unduly rosy represen-
tation.15 It also recognized that permitting a right of action under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 merely because the plaintiff is a security
holder would encourage spurious and vexatious litigation.' More-
over, absent the Birnbaum Rule, bystanders to the securities mar-
keting process could await developments without risk, claiming that
inaccuracies in disclosure caused nonselling in a falling market., 7
Since such situations were precisely the target of Blue Chip, the court
denied plaintiff standing under § 10(b).111
The "In Connection With" Requirement 9
Several recent cases have addressed the Birnbaum requirement
that there be a connection between the alleged fraud and the securi-
ties purchase or sale. In Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises,
384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Feldman v. Hanley, 59 F.R.D. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hirsch
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
This outcome is consonant with the Blue Chip decision, which would deny standing
under Rule lob-5 even to shareholders who could allege that their failure to sell was
due to defendant's failure to disclose unfavorable information. 421 U.S. at 737-38.
At any rate, the aborted seller exception no longer appears to have much vitality
in view of Blue Chip. The majority in Blue Chip discussed and rejected the "functional
equivalency of a contract" reasoning employed by the court of appeals. See Manor
Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 142 (9th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S.
723 (1975). Thus, the aborted purchaser-seller doctrine has been limited to plaintiffs
who were at least parties to a breached contract for the purchase or sale of securities.
' CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,383 at 98,909, quoting 421 U.S. at 737-38.
1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,383 at 98,909.
"1 Id. at 98,910, quoting 421 U.S. at 747.
Ms The court also considered the validity of plaintiff's claim under § 17(a) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), involving fraudulent interstate transactions in the
offer or sale of securities. There is still some doubt as to whether § 17(a) affords a
private cause of action. See Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding yes);
Crowell v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 373 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(holding yes). But see Reid v. Mann, 381 F. Supp. 525, 528 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding
no cause of action afforded). Other courts have refrained from resolving the issue in
cases where claims were also asserted under the 1934 Act. See, e.g., Schaefer v. First
Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1975); Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group,
Inc., 60 F.R.D. 217, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The Supreme Court in Blue Chip also failed
to express an opinion on the issue. 421 U.S. at 734 n.6. The Thompson court nonethe-
less declined to grant plaintiff standing because no purchase or sale was involved in
the alleged fraud. To allow plaintiff standing under § 17(a) in this situation would be
to stretch the flexibility of the provision beyond bounds. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
95,383 at 98,910.
M' See also note 114 supra, discussing Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp.,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,285 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1975).
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Inc.,12 the court followed the Blue Chip holding by refusing to grant
standing to shareholders claiming damages foi alleged misrepre-
sentations made by directors of an issuing company in violation of
§ 10(b). The claims arose from defendant's purchase of stock at a
premium, followed by the election of three new directors and the
appointment by the board of directors of a new president and chief
executive officer. Because the plaintiffs, having been shareholders of
the issuer prior to the violations, did not allege that they had bought
or sold any stock in connection with the claimed violation, the court
dismissed the § 10(b) claim for failure to satisfy the Birnbaum
Rule. 12
1
In addition, the court indicated that it would not allow the plain-
tiffs to circumvent the Birnbaum Rule by suing under a different
section of the 1934 Act. Specifically, the court applied the principles
of Blue Chip and Birnbaum to dismiss plaintiffs' claim based on a
§ 13(d) 12 reporting violation'. Section 18121 was held to bar the plain-
tiffs' § 13(d) claim by its requirement that a person who makes a false
or misleading statement shall be liable for damages only to those who
bought or sold securities in reliance upon and at a price affected by
such statement. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that § 13(d)
grants an implied private right of action regardless of their status as
purchasers or sellers. Courts have found such private rights of action
on behalf of issuers"4 and shareholders'2 under § 13(d), but only in
cases involving purely injunctive relief.26 To allow damages suits
120 CCH FED. Ssc. L. REP. 95,286 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1975).
"I1 Plaintiffs in effect alleged that the mere retention of their stock gave them
standing to sue under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This allegation has always been found
insufficient to meet the purchaser-seller requirement. See Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d
580 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967);
Feldman v. Hanley, 59 F.R.D. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"1 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). Section 13(d) requires the filing of certain reports
by those who acquire directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of more than 5%
of a class of a registered equity security.
I23 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
,2, See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972).
'' See Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
'' Although there is no authority restricting standing in suits under § 13(d) to
plaintiffs who are purchasers or sellers, such a holding is a logical extension of the
Supreme Court's decision in Blue Chip. To allow one who is neither a purchaser nor
seller to circumvent the Birnbaum Rule by suing under § 13(d) would undoubtedly
result in the same "vexatious litigation" that the Court cited as the reason for limiting
Rule 10b-5 standing. See 421 U.S. at 739-44.
The court appeared to apply this rationale in rejecting plaintiffs' final contention
that their complaint stated a cause of action for injunctive relief. It noted that even if
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based merely on one's status as a security holder would permit plain-
tiffs to circumvent the Birnbaum Rule simply by casting their com-
plaint to include alleged violations of § 13(d). This is contrary to the
intent of the Blue Chip decision. 12
Another recent decision addressing the "in connection with" re-
quirement was Bio-Medical Sciences, Inc. v. Weinstein.'2 In Wein-
stein, plaintiff issuer brought a Rule 10b-5 action against its chief
executive officer alleging he had defrauded purchasers of plaintiff's
securities. The plaintiff alleged that as a result of this conduct and
consequent litigation, it suffered numerous disadvantages and sub-
stantial damages. The court found that the loss suffered by the plain-
tiff was not "in connection with" the sale of the securities in question
because the loss was not suffered directly on account of the sale
itself.ln The court chose this narrow construction of the "in connec-
plaintiff's contention were true, it must fail for lack of a showing of irreparable harm
absent injunctive relief. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
'2 Although a plaintiff may not be able to circumvent Birnbaum under § 13(d),
courts may not likewise apply the same reasoning to limit standing in a tender offer
suit. In McCloskey v. Epko Shoes, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (a pre-Blue
Chip case), the court refused to extend Birnbaum to bar standing to a plaintiff chal-
lenging the validity of a tender offer. The overriding purpose of § 14(e) was found to
be the protection of the investor. See H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d
421 (1st Cir. 1973); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597
(D.N.J.), aff'd, 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1974). The court determined that a strict applica-
tion of the Birnbaum Rule would be clearly contrary to this legislative purpose. Section
14(e) does not contain the words "purchase or sale" as does § 10(b), and this may
indicate that one of the goals of § 14(e) was to eliminate the purchase and sale require-
ment in the tender offer context. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 377
(1969). The court further determined that the relaxation of Birnbaum would apply to
§ 14(e) suits for damages as well as injunctive relief. This too is amply supportable.
See H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973); Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971). Nor
does it appear the court was incorrect in allowing possible injunctive relief although
the tender offers had been completed. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,
419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
121 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,445 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1976).
I" The court in Wright v. Heizer Corp., note 93 supra, also considered the "in
connection with" requirement. The plaintiffs had complained of injury to themselves
as investors or holders of IDC securities purchased prior to the alleged violations and
maintained that this status sufficed to give them standing to sue under Rule 10b-5.
This argument was based upon Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d
654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), in which plaintiff was granted
standing to bring a Rule 10b-5 suit based on his guarantee of an obligation which was
an integral part of a tripartite security transaction. Plaintiff was an investor in the
company whose stock was fraudulently sold. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
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tion with" requirement as being the one most consistent with Blue
Chip.' Although the court admitted that the Blue Chip holding was
actually irrelevant to the facts of this case, it nonetheless interpreted
the opinion as indicating a reluctance to expand the ambit of Rule
10b-5 liability.
The court indicated that the great difficulty in assessing damages
was another reason for limiting the "in connection with" concept.
Because the defendant officer in Weinstein sought to benefit himself
by enhancing the assets of the plaintiff and thereby increasing the
value of its shares, the court would have to begin assessment with the
question of whether the plaintiff could have survived at all but for
the defendant's actions. Unlike other cases sustaining Rule 10b-5
liability, 13' the court would be unable simply to compare the amount
the corporation received with the amount it should have received in
computing the harm resulting from the sale. The Court in Blue Chip
noted the dangers of imposing "liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time. ' 1 32 The same considerations apply in lim-
Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10, 12-13 (1971). The Wright court noted that while Eason's
role as an investor undoubtedly motivated him to give his guarantee, it was incidental
to the undertaking he sought to avoid. CCH FAD. SEC. L. REP. T 95,399 at 99,049. Thus,
the court rejected the Wright plaintiffs' standing argument, concluding that the Eason
investor rationale should not survive Blue Chip because of an insufficient connection
with the purchase and sale of securities. See 421 U.S. at 737, 738.
"I CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 99,399 at 99,237. This interpretation is consistent with
other cases in which an issuer sued its officers or directors on Rule 10b-5 counts. See
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
932 (1974); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp.,
339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th
Cir. 1960): Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kane v. Central Am.
Mining & Oil, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); New Park Mining Co. v. Cran-
mer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
In Vesco, for example, a Rule 10b-5 claim by an issuer was sustained on an
allegation that the issuer had been induced by defendant directors improvidently to
dispose of some of its stock holdings by way of a dividend in kind. The Second Circuit
wrestled with the problem of whether such a dividend in kind could be deemed a
"sale." Having answered that question affirmatively, the court had no trouble in
holding that defendants would be liable on a showing that the issuer had received
inadequate consideration for the assets it had thus been induced to "sell."
Conversely, in Hoover v. Allen, supra, a case involving the purchase of its own
stock by a corporation at an artifically depressed price, the court found no violation
of Rule 10b-5 because the corporation could not have been injured by the purchase
itself, despite an allegation that the defendant's motive for depressing the price had
been to assist them in a fraudulent scheme of manipulating corporate control.
'3' See note 130 supra.
421 U.S. at 748, quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
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iting the "in connection with" aspect of Birnbaum. Thus, the court's
application of Blue Chip to the "in connection with" issue seems
proper.
D. Damages
The purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to protect investors, to insure equal-
ity of information between buyers and sellers, and to protect the
integrity of the securities market.' An ideal Rule 10b-5 damage ra-
tionale would provide a plaintiff with adequate* compensation for
economic losses resulting from a defendant's violation of Rule 10b-5
without unduly burdening the defendant. This position, combined
with a judicial flexibility which adapts remedies to the circumstances
of each case, would best carry out the purposes of Rule 10b-5. Inves-
tors would be compensated for losses caused by violations of the Rule,
violations would be made unprofitable and hence discouraged, and
protective litigation would be encouraged.
1 34
In attempting to achieve an ideal damage award, courts have
devised a number of different measures. The most common measure
is the out-of-pocket theory, which permits recovery of the difference
between the fair market value of the securities at the time of the
fraudulent transfer and the actual consideration paid."' Another
measure is the rescission theory,131 under which the securities are
returned to the seller. This measure reaches essentially the same
result as the out-of-pocket theory, because increases in the values of
the securities during the period between the sale and the remedy
inure to the defrauded seller.37 The Supreme Court has modified
these theories to provide a third measure-the difference between
"I In the words of the Supreme Court, § 10(b) "is not limited to preserving the
integrity of the securities markets ... though that purpose is included. Section 10(b)
must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively." Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (citation omitted).
'3 Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions, 1972
U. ILL. L.F. 651, 651-52.
11 Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The fair value of the
security is usually computed on the date of the transaction. When the security is
seldom traded, however, subsequent sales which more accurately reflect the true values
will be used to measure the plaintiff's loss. Id.
"' See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 743 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
879 (1965).
"I See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D. Md. 1968), modified, 412 F.2d 571
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
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what the seller received and the fair value of what he would have
received had there been no fraudulent conduct. if the defendant re-
ceived more than the defrauded seller's actual loss, damages would
be the amount of the defendant's profit.'38 Fourth, courts now provide
plaintiff-purchasers with consequential damages upon establishing a
causal nexus with the underlying fraud.39 These damages would in-
clude expenses legitimately attributable to the defendant's fraudu-
lent conduct. "' Finally, damages may be awarded a defrauded seller
based on the amount it would cost him to reinvest in the same secu-
rity within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud."' This is
known as the "cover" theory.
In recent attempts to effectuate investor protection and fraud
deterrence without financially destroying defendants, courts have
reconsidered certain damages measures. Specifically, these policy
considerations have been treated in the context of burdens of proof
in consequential damages, mitigation of damages, and the date of
valuation and defendant's special efforts regarding out-of-pocket
losses.
Although the most common measure of damages in Rule 10b-5
cases-the out-of-pocket theory-usually amounts to the difference
between what the seller received for his stock and what he would have
received had there been no fraudulent conduct,' one important ex-
ception exists: if the defendant received more on resale than the latter
amount, then the award is the amount of the defendant's profit over
and above what he had paid to the plaintiff. In that situation, the
profit is considered a proximate consequence but must be limited to
"I' See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972), citing
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
Affiliated Ute applied this measure to sellers only, but the Second Circuit in Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973), would
apply to it purchasers also, granting them profits from their purchase proceeds if such
proceeds could be traced with any certainty. Id. at 802 n.10.
11 See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974); Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973);
Survey of 1974 Securities Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 767-69
(1975).
"' See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 789
(1965), quoting Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900).
"I See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104-06 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Fridrich v. Bradford, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,723 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
"I Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1975).
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the amount not due to the defendant's own special efforts after the
fraud occurred.'
In Thomas v. Duralite Co.,'" the Third Circuit considered the
issue of the defendant's special efforts in fashioning a damages
award. The plaintiff in Thomas was a former shareholder of Duralite
who sued the corporation and two of its officers to recover losses
resulting from misrepresentations made in connection with Duralite's
repurchase of his stock. In reviewing the damages award of the dis-
trict court,' the Third Circuit held that the individual defendants
were not properly credited with the results of their special efforts and
talents on behalf of the corporation."' The court held that the district
court's damages award, constituting the difference between what
plaintiff received and what defendants received for the stock when
the Duralite purchase was negotiated, should be reconsidered on re-
mand. It indicated that the defendants' profit figure should be de-
creased by the amount of such profit properly creditable to their
efforts in enhancing the corporation's value.
The court stated that the theory of damages permitting windfall
profits does not depend solely upon the premise that but for the fraud
the injured party would have realized such gains."7 In addition, the
defendant should not be allowed to keep profits made through the use
of fraudulently acquired assets.' This doctrine has definite limita-
"1 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Rochez Bros.
v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir. 1974) (no allowance for defendant's special
efforts because efforts not made after purchase of plaintiff's stock); Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); 3 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRMES
LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 § 9.1 (1971).
'" 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975).
"' Thomas v. Duralite Co., 386 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J. 1974). The district court
imposed liability upon the two individual defendants, stripping them of all windfall
profits which they received. Id. at 727.
"I Specifically, the defendants had financially revitalized Duralite, thereby in-
creasing its value to the company which eventually purchased Duralite. Defendant's
managerial efforts had been the primary factor inducing this purchase which in turn
made the Duralite stock more valuable than when the plaintiff had sold it.
"1 524 F.2d at 589. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972). There, the Supreme Court, in an effort to chill executive fraud and chicanery,
adopted a judge-made alternative damages rule which went beyond merely compensat-
ing a defrauded party to the extent of his loss, but also deprived the perpetrator of the
fraud of all fraudulently incurred gain. As a result, not only would the victim be made
whole but the guilty party would derive no undue benefit, windfall or otherwise, from
the product of his fraud.
I" See Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965).
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tions,14 9 however, and no court has ever applied this approach to
assess damages for an indefinite time in the future. Thus the court,
in addition to recognizing the special efforts limitation, placed a time
limitation on damage awards. Because of the difficulty in determin-
ing precisely when the defendants' special efforts began to affect the
rise in values of plaintiff's stock, the court refused to apply strictly
the windfall profits theory.
By modifying the lower court's strict application of the windfall
profits theory, the Third Circuit effected a more equitable assessment
of damages.' Although the court refused to impose a financial bur-
den in excess of the defendants' wrongful conduct, the deterrent
effect '5 upon future violators was -probably not undermined. An im-
19 See Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 677 n.122; Note, Rule 10b-5: The Rejection of the Birnbaum
Doctrine by Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. and the Need for a New
Limitation on Damages, 1974 DuKE L.J. 610.
"" The Third Circuit also ordered that the assessment of prejudgment interest be
reconsidered. It noted that interest is not recoverable merely as compensation for
money withheld but rather, in response to fairness considerations, 524 F.2d at 589. See
Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
In addition, the Third Circuit vacated the lower court judgment against Duralite
for compensatory damages. 524 F.2d at 586. It recognized that the individual defen-
dants had acted solely for their own personal benefit, and that the plaintiff was aware
of this. Furthermore, Duralite had not bought Thomas' shares. The court found the
doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable to the present case. Id. In Thomas any
judgment payable by the corporate defendant would be at the expense of innocent
members of the public who held shares in the corporation which had later acquired
Duralite. This result would be patently unfair, and thus, the circuit court appeared to
be correct in imposing liability solely upon the individual defendants. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring);
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. Ray. 1340, 1370 (1966). But cf.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3558-59 (U.S. Apr. 6, 1976) (No. 75-355) ($25.8 million damages
awarded against corporation for § 14(e) violation).
' The deterrent effect also played a major role in a case involving indemnification
and contribution, Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The case involved a brokerage company which was the named defendant in
actions for alleged violations of federal antifraud securities laws. In connection with
those actions, the company filed third-party complaints against a bank for indemnifi-
cation and contribution as to any amounts for which the company may be held liable.
The court denied Shearson indemnification, noting that this should be done whether
Shearson's conduct involved actual knowledge of violations, reckless disregard of the
truth or mere negligence. Thus, the court reaffirmed the rule prohibiting indemnity
among joint wrongdoers as set out in Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276,
1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970), and rejected the comparative
fault standard proposed by some commentators. See, e.g., Ruder, Multiple Defendants
in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
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position of sweeping liability in Thomas would have amounted to an
assessment of punitive damages, which has been prohibited in the
past.1
52
Nevertheless, federal courts have increasingly recognized the
buyer's right to consequential damages' 3 where it can be proven with
reasonable certainty that such damages were caused by the defen-
dant's Rule 10b-5 violation.'54 In Foster v. Financial Technology,
Inc. ," the plaintiffs had bought franchises from defendant corpora-
tion's subsidiary and had agreed to sign releases of claims against
the corporation upon nonperformance of the franchise agreement.
They were to receive the stock of another company in exchange for
signing the releases. Upon nondelivery of the stock, the plaintiffs
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 658 (1972).
Although the Odette court barred Shearson from indemnification, it did state that
contribution may be available to it from the bank should it establish joint liability at
trial. The court found that the same deterrent policy which required that an underwri-
ter not be permitted to shift its entire liability to another through indemnification also
mandated that tortfeasors other than the underwriter not be allowed to escape liability
for damages. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 422 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). Although this
holding goes against the traditional American no-contribution rule, see Union Stock
Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905), it makes sense in the securities
fraud context. Application of the no-contribution rule would result in the denial of
contribution between all defendants in securities law cases, and this would violate the
intent of Congress in this area. See § 11(f) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970),
and §§ 9(e), 18(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1970).
112 See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970);
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
Indeed, § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970), may be read as prohibiting
punitive damages. Moreover, specific recovery provisions of the 1934 Act limit relief
to the consideration paid by the claimant. Section 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970)
(registration statement liability), § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) (prospectus liabil-
ity). Nor does there appear to be any indication that Congress intended imposition of
such damages by the securities acts. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., supra at
1230, Green v. Wolf Corp., supra at 303.
Nonetheless, punitive damages are permissible under state laws. Under the doc-
trine of pendent jurisdiction, punitive damages for fraud are recoverable in federal
courts on state law claims when those laws allow such damages. Flaks v. Koegel, 504
F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974); Coffee v. Permian Corp., 474 F.2d 1040, 1044 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 920 (1973); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 1972).
15 For a discussion of consequential damages and recent cases dealing with them,
see Survey of 1974 Securities Law Developments, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 767-69
(1975).
"I See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-40 (7th Cir. 1974); Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 802-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
(1973); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
' 517 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975).
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brought suit against the parent corporation and its officers for failure
to register the sale of the stock to be delivered under § 5 of the 1933
Act'56 and for certain misrepresentations under Rule 10b-5."17 The
court held that if plaintiffs could prove their Rule 10b-5 claim they
would be able to recover consequential damages. It reasoned that
when the plaintiffs entered into the settlement agreement, they had
monetary claims against the subsidiary. Because the defendant had
also induced the plaintiffs to forego suing upon their claims for two
and a half months in the settlement agreement, the court determined
that the plaintiffs may have suffered a compensable loss if they could
have realized more than they ultimately did on the claims.'58
To establish consequential damages under the Foster analysis, the
plaintiffs would have to prove: first, that defendant's misrepresen-
tations violated Rule 10b-5; second, that but for these misrepresen-
tations, plaintiffs would have brought suit on their claim against the
subsidiary at the earlier date; and third, that any losses plaintiffs
incurred were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of these misre-
presentations.'59 These damages do not necessarily include the full
difference between what the plaintiffs would have realized on their
claim had they asserted it promptly and what they ultimately re-
ceived in the bankruptcy proceeding. Instead, they are limited by the
familiar mitigation of damages principle to what they would have
realized had the plaintiffs acted upon their claim when they first
learned of the fraud.6 ' Thus, at the point where a reasonable man,
either because of the breach or the discovery of the fraud, would have
taken action to protect himself from further depreciation in the value
of the claim, the chain of causation would be cut, and plaintiffs
should not be awarded damages for subsequent losses.'
am 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Section 5 requires registration statements for a security
if it is to be sold through the mail or any other instrument of interstate commerce.
"5 517 F.2d at 1071.
" Id. at 1072. Such opportunity-lost damages are similar to those incurred in
Zeller, supra note 138, in which, because of a Rule 10b-5 violation, a corporation lost
the extra profits it would have earned had it reinvested its excess funds in its own
operation instead of using them to purchase securities from the defendant. 476 F.2d
at 803. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1974). Cf.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972).
517 F.2d at 1072.
' See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1968).
The court recognized that plaintiffs were not asserting a breach of contract claim but
stated that the reasonable conduct standard applies in determining the amount of the
plaintiff's loss for which defendants should be held responsible. 517 F.2d at 1072.
"I The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected defendant's argumert that because
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Conceivably, the plaintiffs may have difficulty in meeting the
three-part test established by the court to prove consequential dam-
ages, particularly the foreseeability element. Yet the requirement
that the plaintiff mitigate his losses prevents imposition of an undue
burden upon defendants.' By carefully limiting the possibility of
recovering consequential damages, the Ninth Circuit has imple-
mented the purposes behind the federal securities laws and Rule 10b-
5.163
Another case dealing with the mitigation concept was Harris v.
American Investment Co. 64 The plaintiff, a shareholder in the defen-
dant company, alleged that he was the victim of an ongoing scheme
of misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment of information in
violation of Rule 10b-5. He further alleged that this scheme caused
him to suffer damages by inducing him to hold the stock beyond the
time in which he could have recouped his initial outlay.
The Eighth Circuit noted that the normal measure of damages in
such actions was plaintiffs actual pecuniary out-of-pocket loss rather
than his loss of bargain. 6 5 The usual time at which damages under
the plaintiffs failed to execute the releases and subsequently submitted their claims
in the bankruptcy proceedings, they should be precluded from recovery damages. This
notion of election of remedies apparently assumed that the remedies of rescission and
consequential damages for losses suffered prior to that rescission are inconsistent. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(1)(b), Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
Under this argument, the plaintiffs upon learning of the fraud would face the dilemma
of seeking rescission and thereby waiving their right to recover consequential dam-
ages, or not seeking rescission, which might subject them to further, uncompensated
losses. Thus, the court's conclusion-that the plaintiffs' prosecution of their claims
against the corporation was the reasonable conduct required to prevent suffering fur-
ther loss-seems proper.
"62 See Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule 10b-5 Actions,
1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651. The court further limited the plaintiffs' recovery by deducting
that sum compensating them for the risk that their claims would drop in value over
the 75-day forbearance period. This was done to prevent plaintiffs from receiving a
double recovery. 517 F.2d at 1072.
'1 See note 134 supra.
's 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 784 (1976).
's 523 F.2d at 225. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 239 (7th Cir.
1974); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478-79 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973);
Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d
527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962). But see Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 190-
91 (6th Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 801-03 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); see generally 6 L. Loss, SEcumTIES REGULATION 3922-
23 (Supp. 1969); Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Ac-
tively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 383-85 (1974); Note, Measurement of
Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165, 172. See also
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 100 at 733-34 (4th ed. 1971).
1976]
968 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
the out-of-pocket rule are ascertained is the date of purchase.", How-
ever, the court refused to apply the date of purchase measurement
in this case because of the difficulty in determining the actual worth
of the securities.' 7 Since the misrepresentation allegedly affected the
market price of the securities, the court found that a more apt time
measurement would be the date of discovery of the fraud.6 8 This
holding is logical, because only when the public discovers the fraud
can the market reflect the true value of the stock unaffected by the
defendant's alleged fraud.
The court also held that defrauded buyers of securities may main-
tain an action for damages though continuing to hold the securities."9
Thus, it found that the plaintiff was under no duty to sell his stock
in the defendant before maintaining a Rule 10b-5 action or to miti-
gate his damages.' ° Presumably, where one has bought securities for
long-term investment, it would be inappropriate to apply a rule re-
1" Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
The First Circuit stated:
[T]he damages are to be reckoned solely by the difference between
the real value of the property at the date of its sale to the plaintiffs
and the price paid for it, with interest from that date, and, in addition,
such outlays as were legitimately attributable to the defendant's con-
duct, but not damages covering the expected fruits of an unrealized
speculation.
Id. at 786. Accord, Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, 496 F.2d 1255,
1264-65 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp.,
304 F. Supp. 980, 991 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds,
452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
"I It should be noted that the typical fact situation in cases applying the date of
purchase measurement involves an alleged fraudulent concealment or misrepresen-
tation by a seller directed only at the buyer-plaintiff rather than the public at large.
Hence, the actual worth of the securities at the time of the purchase by the plaintiff
is easily determinable. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"1 523 F.2d at 226. See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 549, comment c at 30-32 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1965). The general rule for applying this time measurement is when
defendant's conduct is alleged to have caused an artificial market of long duration.
See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969); see also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 306 F. Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
"1 523 F.2d at 227. See Sackett v. Beaman, 399 F.2d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1968); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 262 (D. Md. 1971), aff'd in part & rev'd
in part on other grounds, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974);
Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F. Supp. 756, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"I At common law, a defrauded purchaser of securities was under no duty to sell
them prior to maintaining an action for deceit, but could hold them for investment
purposes if he chose. See, e.g., Hindman v. First Nat'l Bank, 112 F. 931, 935-36 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 186 U.S. 483 (1902).
